

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 STATE 014059 TOSEC 010017

63

ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 (ISO) R

66011

DRAFTED BY: EUR/SE:WLEAGLETON

APPROVED BY: EUR/SE:WLEAGLETON

EUR:REWING

S/S-O:DMACKE

----- 063506

O 202043Z JAN 76 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 014059 TOSEC 010017

EXDIS ATTN: ASST SECRETARY HARTMAN

FOLLOWING REPEAT ANKARA 0454 ACTION SECSTATE INFO ATHENS
NICOSIA USUN 20 JAN

QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 0454

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, TU, CY, GR

SUBJ: SECRETARY'S JANUARY IQU MESSAGE TO CAGLAYANGIL

REF: (A) STATE 012740, (B) ANKARA 0421

1. DCM DELIVERED SECRETARY'S MESSAGE (REF A) UNDER COVER
OF AMBASSADOR'S TRANSMITTAL LETER (REF B) TO MFA DIRGEN
POLITICAL AFFAIRS NECDET TEZEL AFTERNOON JANUARY 19. TEZEL
EXPRESSED THANKS FOR SECRETARY'S MESSAGE, SAID HE WOULD
TRANSMIT IT TO CAGLAYANGIL SOONEST, AND INDICATED HIS
CERTAINTY THAT CAGLAYANGIL WOULD GIVE IT MOST CAREFUL STUDY.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 014059 TOSEC 010017

2. TEZEL CONTINUED THAT, AS SET FORTH IN AMBASSADOR'S

COVERING LETTER, SECRETARY'S MESSAGE HAD IN FACT BEEN SOMEWHAT OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS. GOT HAD NOW PUBLICLY EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT NEGOTIATIONS WOULD RESUME ON FEBRUARY 17 IN VIENNA. BUT, TEZEL WENT ON, GOT HAD SOME DIFFERENCES WITH GOG CONCERNING THE FRAMEWORK OF THE RESUMED TALKS WHICH TURKS WERE TRYING TO RESOLVE IN DIRECT CONVERSATIONS WITH ATHENS THROUGH GREEK AMBASSADOR COSMADOPOULOS.

3. TURKS FELT THAT THEY HAD REACHED AGREEMENT WITH GREEKS IN BRUSSELS ON A VERY IMPORTANT POINT. (TEZEL MAINTAINED THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER SHOULD BE AWARE OF THIS BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN DETAIL AT SECRETARY'S BREAKFAST MEETING WITH CAGLAYANGIL.) TEZEL SAID THAT GAME PLAN ENVISAGED IN GREEK-TURKISH BRUSSELS CONVERSATIONS PROVIDED THAT WALDHEIM'S UPCOMING MEETING WITH DENKTASH AND CLERIDES WOULD BE LARGELY PROCEDURAL; I.E., TWO SUBCOMMITTEES (WITH MAINLAND EXPERTS FROM BOTH SIDES) WOULD BE FORMED, ONE ON TERRITORY AND ONE ON CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS. SHORTLY THEREAFTER TALKS WOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO NICOSIA.

4. ONCE SUBCOMMITTEES STARTED DISCUSSIONS IN NICOSIA, SAID TEZEL, DENKTASH AND CLERIDES WOULD MEET FROM TIME TO TIME TO REVIEW SUBCOMMITTEE WORK AND TO GIVE NECESSARY INSTRUCTION. PERIODICALLY, AS THESE TALKS WENT FORWARD, DENKTASH AND CLERIDES WOULD HAVE FURTHER TALKS WITH WALDHEIM.

5. IT WAS NEVER TURKISH IDEA, MAINTAINED TEZEL, THAT THERE WOULD BE MARATHON DETAILED SUBSTANTIVE TALKS AMONG WALDHEIM, CLERIDES, AND DENKTASH. SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WAS AN AUTOMATIC NON-STARTER, ASSERTED TEZEL. PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS CALLED FOR CLERIDES TO BRING TERRITORIAL PROPOSALS TO VIENNA, WHILE DENKTASH WOULD BRING A CONSTITUTIONAL PLAN. ONE DID NOT NEED TO BE A GENIUS, SAID TEZEL, TO PREDICT THAT EACH SIDE'S PROPOSAL WOULD BE EXTREME AT THIS FIRST MEETING. DENKTASH WOULD BE OBLIGED TO SAY NO TO THE GREEK PROPOSALS. CLERIDES' REACTION TO THE TURKISH PROPOSALS MIGHT WELL BE THE SAME. IF VIENNA MEETINGS CONTINUED IN SUCH A VEIN, THEY WOULD NOT ONLY FAIL TO ACHIEVE ANYTHING BUT WOULD ALSO FREEZE POSITIONS AND LEAD TO ANOTHER INDEFINITE STALEMATE.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 014059 TOSEC 010017

6. TEZEL SAID FLATLY THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR DENKTASH TO DISCUSS TERRITORIAL ARRANGEMENTS EXCEPT IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH TURKEY. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT GOT HAD PROPOSED SUBCOMMITTEES WITH MAINLAND GREEK AND TURKISH PARTICIPATION. GREEK CYPRIOTS PROBABLY HAD PARALLEL NEED TO CONSULT ATHENS ON CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS, ARGUED TEZEL. TURKS HAD AGREED WITH GREEKS IN BRUSSELS THAT IF SUBCOMMITTEE

AND DENKTASH-CLERIDES TALKS IN CYPRUS GOT STYMIED, THEN BITSIOS AND CAGLAYANGIL WOULD MEET AS OFTEN AS NECESSARY TO RESOLVE DIFFERENCES.

7. TEZEL URGED THAT THE USG ACCEPT THE LOGIC OF THIS APPROACH. IT MADE SENSE, HE SAID, THAT TO MAKE PROGRESS TALKS SHOULD MOVE FROM THE BOTTOM TO THE TOP, I.E., A THREE-TIERED ARRANGEMENT STARTING WITH SUBCOMMITTEES, FROM WHICH THERE WOULD BE AN APPEAL TO DENKTASH-CLERIDES LEVEL, AND THE BITSIOS-CAGLAYANGIL FORUM WOULD ACT AS FINAL ARBITER. THIS WOULD GIVE BOTH SIDES THE NEEDED ROOM FOR MANEUVER, TEZEL ARGUED. IF TALKS STARTED AT AN OVERLY HIGH LEVEL WITH WALDHEIM PERSONALLY AND CONTINUOUSLY INVOLVED, TEZEL SAID, THEN THERE WOULD BE NO READY OPPORTUNITY FOR MAINLAND GOVERNMENTS SUBSEQUENTLY AND QUIETLY TO INTERVENE.

8. FOREGOING REPRESENTED CONSIDERED TURKISH VIEWPOINT, SAID TEZEL. UNFORTUNATELY, HE WENT ON, WALDHEIM WAS SUCH A CREATURE OF VANITY THAT HE THOUGHT THAT IF HE AHD TEN DAYS OR TWO WEEKS ALONE WITH DENKTA AND CLERIDES HE COULD SOLVE THE PROBLEM HIMSELF. THIS WAS JUST NOT POSSIBLE. FOR TACTICAL REASONS, TEZEL WENT ON, THE GREEKS ARE PLAYING UP TO WALDHEIM'S VANITY IN THE HOPE OF WINNING HIM OVER TO THEIR SIDE.

9. TEZEL THEN INSISTED THAT HIS CRITICAL COMMENTS ABOUT WALDHEIM DID NOT INDICATE A TURKISH DESIRE TO ELIMINATE A UN PRESENCE IN THE TALKS. TURKS ENVISAGED THAT UN REPRESENTATIVE ON CYPRUS WOULD PLAY A MAJOR AND USEFUL ROLE, AS UNSYG'S REPRESENTATIVE, BOTH IN SUBCOMMITTEE DISCUSSIONS AND IN DENKTASH-CLERIDES TALKS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 014059 TOSEC 010017

10. TEZEL CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT ALL OF FOREGOING HAD BEEN PUT TO ATHENS VIA AMBASSADOR COSMADOPOULOS AND TURKS WERE NOW AWAITING REPLY. HE SAID HE WAS NOT OVERLY SANGUINE AS TO THE RESULT. MAKARIOS' PLOY TO LINK RENEWED TALKS TO LATEST UNGA RESOLUTION AND CLERIDES' LATEST RESIGNATION THREAT HAD RAISED DOUBTS IN TURKISH MINDS AS TO WHETHER A GENUINE GREEK-CYPRIOT INTERLOCUTEUR VALABLE REALLY EXISTED.

11. DCM STRESSED REPEATEDLY THROUGHOUT CONVERSATION THAT TIME WAS OF THE ESSENCE. HE SAID, DRAWING ON COMMENTS MADE BY RECENT VISITORS FROM CODEL MORGAN, THAT CONTINUING APPARENT STALEMATE IN GETTING MEANINGFUL TALKS GOING, WITH CONSEQUENT LACK OF ANY VISIBLE PROGRESS IN RESOLVING CYPRUS PROBLEM, COULD ONLY HAVE A MOST DELETERIOUS EFFECT ON OVERALL US-TURKISH RELATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN BILATERAL

MUTUAL SECURITY FIELD. TEZEL REJOINED THAT PROGRESS TOWARDS CYPRUS SOLUTION INVOLVED SERIOUS WORK BY ALL PARTIES INVOLVED. THIS WAS THE ONLY WAY TO DO IT. OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE ANOTHER TWO OR THREE DAY FIASCO IN VIENNA. THIS TURKEY DID NOT WANT. TURKEY WANTED TO START A PROCESS WHERE THERE WOULD BE CONTINUOUS DAY AND NIGHT NEGOTIATIONS. DCM SAID HE NOTED TEZEL'S REMARKS BUT COULD NOT ESCAPE A FEELING OF DEJA VU. IN DECEMBER 1974 AND DECEMBER 1975 THERE HAD BEEN GREEK-TURKISH MEETINGS IN BRUSSELS WHICH RAISED HIGH HOPES. THESE HAD BEEN DASHED. IT WAS NOW UP TO PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED, AND PARTICULARLY TURKS TO SEE THIS DID NOT HAPPEN, DREAMILY, AGAIN.

12. FINALLY, DCM ASKED IF THERE WERE PROSPECT OF SECRETARY KISSINGER AND CAGLAYANGIL MEETING IN BRUSSELS JANUARY 23. TEZEL ASKED WHICH OTHER NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD BE ATTENDING BRUSSELS MEETING. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT CAGLAYANGIL HAD ALREADY ACCEPTED OFFICIAL VISIT TO COPENHAGEN, A VERY SHORT VISIT, WHICH INCLUDED FULL DAY OF ACTIVITIES FOR JANUARY 23. TEZEL NOTED THAT CAGLAYANGIL'S VISIT TO COPENHAGEN WOULD BE FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT OF A "TURKISH STATESMAN" TO DENMARK SINCE FOUNDING OF THE TURKISH REPUBLIC BY ATATURK. (COMMENT: IT WAS CLEAR THAT DEMIREL'S FOREIGN MINISTERS WISHES TO BALANCE OUT RECENT SUCCESSFUL VISIT TO DENMARK BY OPPOSITION LEADER ECEVIT.) TEZEL SAID PERHAPS BOTH TURKISH AND DANISH FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD AGREE TO
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 014059 TOSEC 010017

GO TOGETHER TO BRUSSELS TO HEAR SECRETARY'S REPORT ON RESULTS OF HIS MOSCOW VISIT, BUT THAT CAGLAYANGIL PREFERRED TO LEAVE QUESTION OPEN FOR THE TIME BEING.
MACOMBER
UNQUOTE SISCO

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TOSEC, PERSONAL OPINION, POLICIES, POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 20 JAN 1976
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: saccheem
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976STATE014059
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: EUR/SE:WLEAGLETON
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760021-0738
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760140/aaaabjih.tel
Line Count: 206
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 76 STATE 12740, 76 ANKARA 421
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: saccheem
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 25 MAR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <25 MAR 2004 by CollinP0>; APPROVED <03 AUG 2004 by saccheem>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SECRETARY'S JANUARY IQU MESSAGE TO CAGLAYANGIL
TAGS: PFOR, TU, CY, GR, US, (KISSINGER, HENRY A), (CAGLAYANGIL, IHSAN), (TEZEL, NECDET)
To: SECRETARY
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006